

LAWRENCE MCCREA

NOVELTY OF FORM AND NOVELTY OF SUBSTANCE IN
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY MĪMĀṂSĀ

The late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries witnessed a great flowering of Sanskrit intellectual production in many areas. During this period, key scholars working in the fields of grammar, poetics, and hermeneutics (Mīmāṃsā), at virtually the same moment, began for the first time to explicitly refer to themselves and their views as “new” (navya), in contrast to their predecessors in their respective fields, now labeled as “old” (prācīna, jirṇa, etc.). The grammarian Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, the poetician Jagannātha, and the Mīmāṃsaka Khaṇḍadeva, all active in Varanasi in the latter decades of the sixteenth century and the early decades of the seventeenth, are the first in their respective fields to systematically deploy doxographical distinctions between “new” and “old” in developing their own views.¹

As these scholars began to talk and think of a “New Grammar”, “New Poetics”, and “New Mīmāṃsā”, the model of scholastic “newness” that was certainly foremost in their minds was that of “New Logic” (navyanūya). This “New Logic” had become firmly established with the work of the fourteenth century logician Gaṅgeśa. Gaṅgeśa’s *Tattvacintāmaṇi* marked a decisive break with the earlier logical tradition – much of the later Nyāya literature takes the form of commentaries and sub-commentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* itself, rather than on the *Nyāyasūtra* and its commentaries, which had formed the foundation for most earlier work in the field. Yet the transformation of Nyāya in the wake of Gaṅgeśa’s work, though radical and thoroughgoing, consisted largely in a shift in discursive style and method rather than in a departure from the major tenets and doctrines of the earlier logicians. This new mode of discourse is marked chiefly by an extreme formalization of language – by the elaboration of a set technical terms and categories which allow for an increasingly precise specification of the relations between entities both concrete and abstract, and by an exhaustive effort to develop, in terms of these relations, more and more carefully refined and tested definitions of these entities.

As has been generally recognized, this Navyanyāya mode of formalization came in time to have a decisive impact on Sanskrit philosophical

and technical discourse generally. Certainly by the end of the seventeenth century, the basic elements of Navyanyāya technical terminology were in current use by at least some authors working in most of the major Sanskrit scholastic disciplines; the deployment of such terminology in new fields seems to have played a significant role in the seminal works of the “new” grammarians, poeticians, and Mīmāṃsakas mentioned above. Yet the specific processes by which the formal language of Navyanyāya and the modes of definition and argument associated with it migrated into other disciplines have never been adequately mapped out, and the nature and extent of the transformation in Sanskrit philosophical discourse ensuing from the spread of Navyanyāya methods remain poorly understood.

I would like to make a preliminary effort here to chart and to make sense of the specific applications of Navyanyāya terminology and discursive method in the works of Khaṇḍadeva, the seminal figure in what came ultimately to be known as “New Mīmāṃsā”. It has been rather commonly remarked that Khaṇḍadeva’s works are written in Navyanyāya style,² but a close examination of his major works reveals that, while he does sometimes employ Navyanyāya technical terminology, he does so only sporadically and quite sparingly. The use of such discursive techniques is certainly not in any sense a hallmark of his style. It appears to be, rather, a tool he employs only on rare occasions, and to meet specific purposes.

Judging from my own survey of Khaṇḍadeva’s major works, there would appear to be two quite distinct sorts of discussion in which he typically resorts to the use of Navyanyāya style. The most immediately apparent and most readily explicable occasion for such use is in the conduct of interscholastic debate, either with the New Logicians themselves, or with others who make heavy use of Navyanyāya in their own arguments – most notably the “New Grammarians”.

Sanskrit philosophy of the late sixteenth and seventeenth century produced a tremendously intense debate over the nature of language, chiefly between the grammarians, logicians, and Mīmāṃsakas – all three fields saw the production of works devoted solely to the analyzing the structure of “verbal awareness” (*śābdabodha*);³ Khaṇḍadeva’s own *Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya*, his third and last major work, is the most important entry to this debate from the Mīmāṃsā side.⁴ While the arguments deployed on all sides are complex, this debate turns ultimately on a few key questions – what is the primary qualificand (*pradhāna viśeṣya*) of the verbal awareness arising from a sentence? by what part of the sentence is this primary qualificand expressed? and, exactly how do the

other components of a sentence meaning construe with this primary element to produce a coherent sense? To sum up the positions on the most basic question rather crudely, the Logicians argue that the primary qualificand of a typical sentence is whatever is signified by the term (or terms) marked with the nominative case – what we would in English call the grammatical subject. The grammarians take the action expressed by the verb-root to be the primary qualificand. The Mīmāṃsakas reject both these positions, arguing that the primary qualificand in any sentence is what they call *bhāvanā* – that element of “bringing into being” which characterizes all activity, as distinct from the specific procedures signified by the verbal root. This element of *bhāvanā*, they contend, is expressed not by the root, but by the verbal suffix attached to it.

The basic contours of the Mīmāṃsakas’ argument here are quite old, dating back to the fifth century at least. Yet Khaṇḍadeva’s defense of this long-established Mīmāṃsā position surveys and aims to counter those criticisms recently raised against it by the New Logicians and Grammarians, who both devote considerable energy to demonstrating that *bhāvanā* does not exist at all as something distinct from the meaning of the verb-root. The bulk of Khaṇḍadeva’s *Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya* is devoted to the proof that *bhāvanā* is expressed by the verbal suffix, that it is the primary qualificand of a sentential awareness, and that the meanings of the verbal root, and of all those active factors or *kāraṅkas* (agent, direct object, instrument, etc.) mentioned in the sentence, construe directly with this *bhāvanā* as its “principal qualifiers” (*prakāras* – a term drawn from Navyanyāya language analysis and having no currency in Mīmāṃsā usage prior to Khaṇḍadeva). The argument is framed largely in terms set out by the New Logicians in their own analyses of sentential structures and meanings; apart from the question of *prakāra*, Khaṇḍadeva devotes a great deal of attention to the question of what precisely is the “delimiter of the expressiveness” (*śakyatāvachchedaka*) of the verb-suffix, and what is the “delimiter of the expressed-ness” (*śaktatāvachchedaka*) of its meaning – here again, the terms of the argument are manifestly those Navyanyāya, and are new to Mīmāṃsā discourse.

While Khaṇḍadeva’s reframing of Mīmāṃsā sentence-theory in Navyanyāya terms is most voluminously apparent in his *Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya*, much the same argument, less elaborate but fashioned along the same lines, can be found in his earlier works as well. In his *Mīmāṃsākaustubha* and *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, both of which take the form of commentaries on Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, the general theory of the

verbal suffix and the organization of the other components of the sentence around it is set forth in the Bhāvārthādhikaraṇa (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 2.1.1–4). The *Mīmāṃsākaustubha* is Khaṇḍadeva’s encyclopaedic survey and critique of earlier Mīmāṃsā literature, and appears to have been the first of his major works. The Bhāvārthādhikaraṇa of the *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*⁵ begins by following the pattern typical of Khaṇḍadeva’s treatment of other topics – a careful outlining of the question to be decided (*viśaya*), the doubt which gives rise to this question (*saṃśaya*), the logical connection of this topic with those which precede and follow it (*saṅgati*), the arguments raised by real or theoretical opponents of the accepted conclusion (*pūrvapakṣa*), and the ultimate proof of the validity of this conclusion (*siddhānta*). Having completed this standard treatment of the topic of *bhāvanā*, however, Khaṇḍadeva introduces a new objection and a new line of argument. The objector begins:

All this [preceding argument] would make sense if there really existed some “*bhāvanā*” distinct from the meaning of the verb root. But we don’t see any evidence for this ...⁶

What follows is something very like a miniature version of what will later become the *Bhāṭṭatantrarahasya* – a rehearsal and countering of the New Logicians’ and New Grammarians’ arguments against *bhāvanā*, and an exploration of the ways in which root-meanings, *kāraṅkas*, and other elements of a sentence construe with this *bhāvanā* as the primary qualificand of the sentence. Again, the argument turns on the specification of “delimiters of expressiveness” and “delimiters of expressedness” (*śakyaṭāvachedaka*, *śaktatāvachedaka*), and the understanding of the root-meaning and the *kāraṅkas* as “principal qualifiers” (*prakāras*) of the *bhāvanā*.

Khaṇḍadeva’s use of Navya terminology is relatively free here, but only in this “appendix” to the earlier, *sūtra*-centered discussion of the nature and status of *bhāvanā*. The general confinement of such terminology to this latter section shows clearly that it is being brought in for a specific purpose – to deal with arguments against *bhāvanā* arising outside the Mīmāṃsā system. In discussing the general Mīmāṃsā view on the nature of *bhāvanā* and its place in the sentence, Khaṇḍadeva frames his discussion in terms that would have been familiar to Mīmāṃsakas even a thousand years earlier. Only when directly confronting recent criticisms of the New Logicians and Grammarians does he adopt their idiom. The same pattern is repeated in Khaṇḍadeva’s second major work, his *Bhāṭṭadīpika*, a brief gloss on the twelve chapters of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*; here again, he begins his discussion of the Bhāvārthādhikaraṇa⁷ with a compact presentation of his position on *bhāvanā*, framed in classical

Mīmāṃsā terms, followed by an objection to the very possibility of *bhāvanā*, encapsulating the critiques of the New Logicians and Grammarians, to which Khaṇḍadeva responds by reformulating and reasserting his position through the use of Navyanyāya formal terminology.

Khaṇḍadeva's procedure, in both texts, is hardly surprising; it makes perfect sense that in order to effectively counter recent attacks formulated in Navyanyāya terms Khaṇḍadeva would find it useful, at least in some measure, to adopt such terminology himself. To effectively counter the claim that the subject of a sentence or the meaning of a verb-root is the "primary qualificand" of any sentence, for instance, it is necessary to stake out a position of one's own on what this "primary qualificand" should be. While there is some danger in allowing one's opponents to set the terms of debate, one can respond to specific critiques formulated in terms of a new technical language only by taking up such terminology oneself, either to use it in formulating a counter argument or to challenge its applicability. Still, while it is hardly astonishing that Khaṇḍadeva should find it convenient to adopt a certain amount of Navyanyāya terminology in responding to Navyanyāya arguments, the general confinement of this terminology to such specific responses in his treatment of *bhāvanā* shows clearly that what we see in Khaṇḍadeva's works is not a wholesale adoption of "Navyanyāya style", but a selective application of certain key terms and formal techniques of Navyanyāya to deal with specific problems he confronts in elaborating and defending his positions.

Khaṇḍadeva's use of such techniques, however, though always quite sparing and deliberate, is not confined to occasions when he is confronting the arguments of New Logicians, Grammarians, or other extra-Mīmāṃsā opponents. A second and ultimately more interesting application of Navyanyāya terminology in Khaṇḍadeva's works is in the handling of certain key intra-Mīmāṃsā disputes, particularly in cases where Khaṇḍadeva himself wishes to challenge the established doctrines of earlier Mīmāṃsā. I would like here to examine one particularly noteworthy instance of this phenomenon. It concerns the question of whether and under what circumstances an interpreter must resort to "figurative indication of the meaning of a possessive affix" (*matvarthalakṣaṇā*). Recondite as the question may seem, it had been an issue of some importance in Mīmāṃsā interpretive theory for more than a millennium before Khaṇḍadeva, and Khaṇḍadeva's radical position on the question sparked one of the more heated controversies in seventeenth and eighteenth century Mīmāṃsā. The classic discussion of *matvarthalakṣaṇā* is in the Udbhidadhikaraṇa of the

Mīmāṃsāsūtra (1.4.1–2), and turns on the proper interpretation of the following sentence: “One [who desires cows] should sacrifice with the Udbhid” (“*udbhidā yajeta [paśukāmaḥ]*”).⁸ Here the meaning of the obscure word “*udbhid*” is in question – should we take it to refer to some object which is capable of “digging up” (*udbhedana*), such as a shovel, or should we understand it to be the proper name of a sacrifice?

The classic *Mīmāṃsā* analysis of such Vedic commands requires that one take the sacrificial result – cows, in this case – to be the object of the “bringing into being” expressed by the verbal suffix, and the meaning of the verbal root – sacrifice – to be the instrument (*karaṇa*); thus one can restate the command, “One who desires cows should sacrifice” as “One should bring cows into being by means of sacrifice” (*yāgena paśūn bhāvayet*). In the example above, the term “*udbhid*” occurs in the instrumental case – if one were to interpret it as referring to a shovel or some other such object, one would have a sentence with two instruments – the shovel, and the act of sacrifice. Arguing that it is impossible to connect two instruments with a single *bhāvanā*, the *Mīmāṃsakas* suggest that the term *udbhid* could construe only if one took it to figuratively indicate the meaning of an (unstated) possessive suffix, taking the sentence to mean, “One should bring cows into being by means of a sacrifice containing a shovel” (*udbhidvatā yāgena paśūn bhāvayet*). Rather than resort to such figurative indication, the *Mīmāṃsakas* historically argued that it would be best to interpret the word *udbhid* as the proper name of a particular sacrifice – thereby a single instrument, the particular act of sacrifice, would be designated both by the verb-root and by the proper name, and the sentence could be restated as “One should bring cows into being by means of the sacrifice [called] Udbhid” (*udbhidā yāgena paśūn bhāvayet*). They concede, however, that there are some instances where one must resort to “figurative indication of the meaning of a possessive affix” (*matvarthalakṣaṇā*) to arrive at a satisfactory interpretation. The standard example is “One should sacrifice with Soma” (*somena yajeta*) – the word *soma*, unlike the word *udbhid*, is well known and thoroughly conventionalized in the sense of a particular substance, and cannot be reinterpreted as a sacrificial name without violating our basic linguistic intuitions. So, in such an instance, we must perforce accept *matvarthalakṣaṇā*, and take the sentence to mean “One should bring about a sacrificial result by means of a sacrifice containing *soma*” (*somavatā yāgena phalaṃ bhāvayet*).

In his own treatment of the question of *matvarthalakṣaṇā*, Khaṇḍadeva breaks decisively with the entire earlier *Mīmāṃsā* tradition. He ultimately

comes to the conclusion that one need not resort to *matvarthalakṣaṇā* to explain sentences such as “One should sacrifice with *soma*”, and that one would not need to resort to it to explain “One who desires cows should sacrifice with *udbhid*,” even if the word *udbhid* were taken to signify a substance. (He supports the conclusion that *udbhid* is a sacrificial name, but on grounds other than those adduced by the earlier Mīmāṃsakas.) This challenge to established Mīmāṃsā doctrine occasioned a great deal of controversy between Khaṇḍadeva’s opponents and followers within the field of Mīmāṃsā.⁹ Khaṇḍadeva himself evidently saw it as a major issue in his own work – in addition to the three major texts mentioned earlier, he wrote a small text devoted exclusively to defending his views on the question, under the title “A Rejection of *Matvarthalakṣaṇā*” (*Matvarthalakṣaṇākhaṇḍana*).¹⁰ Khaṇḍadeva’s treatment of the *matvarthalakṣaṇā* question is of considerable interest for our purpose, as his presentation of his own view on the matter differs significantly in the *Mīmāṃsākaustubha* and in the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, and this shift in position appears to be linked with a change in the extent and character of his use of Navyanyāya terminology in the latter work.

When Khaṇḍadeva first outlines his new position on *matvarthalakṣaṇā* in the *Udbhidadhikaraṇa* of the *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*, his presentation, in light of the great controversy that was to ensue from it, seems surprisingly tentative. The ground for his argument is first laid as he sets forth the position of the hypothetical objector or *pūrvapakṣin*. Noting that the standard Mīmāṃsā argument for taking the word *udbhid* as the proper name of a sacrifice rests on the supposed impossibility of there being more than one instrument in a single sentence, the *pūrvapakṣin* directly attacks this premise: there is nothing at all to prevent there from being two or more instruments in a single sentence.¹¹ He points to a quite famous example in which the Mīmāṃsakas themselves accept multiple instruments in a single sentence. In the *Aruṇādhikaraṇa* (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 3.1.12), the following sentence is analyzed: “One purchases the *soma* with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old [cow]” (“*aruṇayā piṅgākṣyāikahāyanyā somaṃ krīṇāti*”).¹² In analyzing this sentence, the Mīmāṃsakas take considerable pains to establish that, contrary to what one might imagine, the term “red” does *not* construe with the word “cow”¹³ – rather, since “red” and “cow” are each marked with the instrumental case-ending, each will construe independently with the *bhāvanā* expressed by the verbal suffix, and each will thereby be understood as an instrument of the act of purchasing the *soma*. It is only by a subsequent awareness (*pārṣṭhikabodha*) that one concludes

that the redness which subserves the act of purchase can do so only by qualifying an object such as the cow, and that the cow which subserves the act of purchase must therefore be red. There is nothing to prevent one from applying the same reasoning to “One who desires cows should sacrifice with *udbhid*.” A shovel or other substance expressed by the word *udbhid*, because it is marked with the instrumental case-ending, and the verb-root “sacrifice”, because of its proximity to the verbal suffix, can both independently construe with the *bhāvanā* as instruments; in a subsequent moment of awareness one will conclude that the “sacrifice” can only be performed by means of some substance, and that the shovel will thus subserve the *bhāvanā* by serving as the material of sacrifice. So, there is no need for *matvarthalakṣaṇā*, and no need to understand the term *udbhid* as the proper name of a sacrifice.

In countering this (self-composed) objection against the standard argument of the Udbhidadhikaraṇa, Khaṇḍadeva offers a three part response. He first offers a new argument which demonstrates, independently of the standard claim of *matvarthalakṣaṇā*, that the word *udbhid* should be taken as the name of a sacrifice, rather than as designating a substance: On the *pūrvapakṣin*'s reading, the command “One who desires cows should sacrifice with *udbhid*,” would have to enjoin, as a means to a specified end, a *bhāvanā*, having as its instrument the action expressed by the verbal root √*yaj* (“to sacrifice”), qualified by a particular substance (the shovel). If, instead, one accepts that *udbhid* is the name of a sacrifice, the command will enjoin, as a means to the specified end, only a *bhāvanā* with the action expressed by the verbal root as its means. This is a simpler reading – one which requires the injunction to enjoin less – and ought to be preferred solely on those grounds.¹⁴ Acceptance of a “qualified injunction” (*viśiṣṭa-vidhāna*) requires that one postulate implicit injunctions to cover each qualifier – such a reading suffers from the fault of “heaviness” (*gaurava*) and ought always to be rejected in favor of an interpretation which requires one to postulate less.

Having established an independent basis for supporting the accepted interpretation of *udbhid*, Khaṇḍadeva then offers a brief defense of the classical *matvarthalakṣaṇā* argument outlined above – that a *bhāvanā* can have one and only one instrument, and that, since the verb root itself must express the instrument of the *bhāvanā*, a substance-expressing term marked with the instrumental case could construe only if it were linked with the meaning of the verb root via a figuratively indicated possessive suffix.¹⁵ Then, and only then, does he outline his own, new argument as an alternative to this standard view:¹⁶ in cases like the

pūrvapakṣin's reading of "One should sacrifice with *udbhid*," and in proper qualified injunctions such as "One should sacrifice with *soma*," both the meaning of the verb-root and the substance expressed by the term in the instrumental case construe, immediately and directly, as instruments of the *bhāvanā* – it is only subsequently (*pārṣṭhika*), when postulating the qualifier injunctions entailed by these qualified injunctions, that one must posit some relation between these two – such as would ordinarily be expressed by a possessive suffix. Khaṇḍadeva now quite readily accepts the parallel the *pūrvapakṣin* drew with "One should purchase the soma with a red, pink-eyed, one-year-old cow" – here too, one has two distinct instruments, which must be subsequently understood to be related to one another. The main point, though, and the key divergence with prior Mīmāṃsā analyses of cases such as "One should sacrifice with *soma*," is the acceptance of two distinct instruments for a single *bhāvanā*. Such a sentence expresses the instrumentality of both the *soma* and the sacrifice, and the subsequent awareness which connects the two in no way undermines this expressed instrumentality.

Even so, Khaṇḍadeva here seems somewhat reluctant to acknowledge the extent of his break with the traditional Mīmāṃsā approach to this question: Khaṇḍadeva's new analysis, as we have seen, preserves a role for the postulation of a possessive relation between these two instruments, if only subsequent to the initial construal of the sentence, and he asserts on this basis that, even if one allows that multiple instruments may construe with a single *bhāvanā*, the *pūrvapakṣin*'s view that the word *udbhid* refers to a substance cannot escape the flaw of *matvarthalakṣaṇā* (ibid., p. 166). But this is actually somewhat disingenuous – as Khaṇḍadeva's initial response to the objection made clear, it is not the specific postulation of a possessive relation which undermines the *pūrvapakṣin*'s case – rather it is the need to postulate any qualifying injunctions at all, to justify his reading of "One who desires cows should sacrifice with *udbhid*" as a qualified injunction. The "heaviness" of this reading would be the same, whether the additional postulated injunctions were understood to convey a possessive relation between the two instruments or not. As both Khaṇḍadeva's supporters and opponents would agree, and as he himself ultimately comes to acknowledge, his position on the question of *matvarthalakṣaṇā* is irreconcilable with all previous accounts, and represents a decisive break with the tradition.

Khaṇḍadeva himself first openly acknowledges this break in the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, again in his treatment of the *Udbhidadhikaraṇa*.¹⁷ The basic argument, though far more terse, is quite similar to that found in the

Mīmāṃsākaustubha, and divides into the same three sections – an explanation of the “heaviness” entailed by the *pūrvapakṣin*’s reading (which is adequate grounds for rejecting it with or without *matvarthalakṣaṇā*), a sketch of the traditional argument that the impossibility of accepting two instruments would force the *pūrvapakṣin* to resort to *matvarthalakṣaṇā* to justify his reading, and, finally, an outline of Khaṇḍadeva’s distinctive argument, which allows multiple instruments for a single *bhāvanā*, and hence eliminates the need for *matvarthalakṣaṇā*, at least in the initial stage of interpretation. Yet, while the structure of the argument remains basically the same, the presentation is quite strikingly different. In the *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*, Khaṇḍadeva presented the traditional view and his own new one simply as two alternate readings of the *adhikaraṇa* without any explicit indication that one should be preferred to the other. Now, for the first time, he labels the traditional view, that view maintained by all *Mīmāṃsakas* without exception up to the time of Khaṇḍadeva himself, as the position of the “old ones” (*prāñcaḥ*). In summing up this position and contrasting it to his own, Khaṇḍadeva now makes it absolutely clear that he regards this “old” view as fundamentally mistaken:

... So [for the reasons just outlined], *matvarthalakṣaṇā* is inescapable – this is the view of the old ones. But, *really*, even in the example [“One should sacrifice with *soma*,”], the *soma* construes precisely as an instrument, and precisely with the *bhāvanā*, since, even if it [the *soma*] is already preempted by one instrument, there is nothing wrong with a second instrument, described by something different (*bhinna-nirūpita*), construing with it as a principal qualifier (*prakāra*). For the instrumentality of the sacrifice is not described by the *bhāvanā*, but is rather described by heaven [the result to which it will lead]. And therefore, just as *its* instrumentality, although described by something other [than the *bhāvanā*], construes with the *bhāvanā* as a principal qualifier, likewise the instrumentality of the *soma*, described by the sacrifice [construes with the *bhāvanā* as a principal qualifier]. And because, in both cases, the fact of their being described by this or that is arrived at only by a subsequent awareness, there is no contradiction [between them]. So, even on this view, although there is no *matvarthalakṣaṇā*, nevertheless the heaviness of enjoining a *bhāvanā* qualified by both sacrifice and its subordinate substance, which is produced by the [inferred] injunction of these qualifiers, befalls [the *pūrvapakṣin*], and cannot be denied.¹⁸

As in the *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*, Khaṇḍadeva briefly notes that a possessive relation between the *soma* and the sacrifice will have to be deduced in a subsequent stage of awareness, but he now describes this as the “*postulation of the meaning of a possessive suffix*” (*matvarthakalpanā*), rather than as *matvarthalakṣaṇā*.¹⁹ As the quoted passage makes absolutely clear, Khaṇḍadeva now denies outright that *matvarthalakṣaṇā* is ever required under any circumstances.

Most noteworthy for our purposes, Khaṇḍadeva's newly forthright rejection of the traditional Mīmāṃsā doctrine on *matvarthalakṣaṇā* is coupled with a redescription of his argument in terms drawn from Navyanyāya. The key point, that multiple instruments may construe with a single *bhāvanā*, is here justified principally by appeal to the Navyanyāya notion of describers (*nirūpakas*). While the sacrifice and the *soma* are both mentioned as instruments, and both construe as principal qualifiers (*prakāras*) of one and the same *bhāvanā*, the instrumentality of the sacrifice and that of the *soma* are "described" (*nirūpita*) by two different entities: by heaven, in one case, and sacrifice itself in the other – the respective results toward which each is conducive. Thus the two instrumentalities are not identical, represent two distinct qualifications of the *bhāvanā*, and therefore do not in any way obstruct or preclude one another. In the *Mīmāṃsākaustubha* Khaṇḍadeva made a case for basically the same conclusion without resorting to Navyanyāya terminology at all, yet here it forms the very basis of his argument.

Simply to note this marked upshift in the use of Navyanyāya terminology in the quoted passage of the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* is not, of course, to explain it. It certainly does not signal any wholesale adoption of the language or discursive method of New Logic on Khaṇḍadeva's part. The use of such terminology in the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* as a whole, while perhaps somewhat more in evidence than in the *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*, remains quite rare and tends to be confined to a few key discussions. What then is the real significance of the terminological shift we see in Khaṇḍadeva's two major treatments of *matvarthalakṣaṇā*? Is the recasting of the debate in Navyanyāya terms mere window-dressing – introducing a bit of trendy jargon into an argument that could have been made just as effectively in more traditional terms? Or is it something more than that – are there things Khaṇḍadeva can say in this new language more than that – are there things Khaṇḍadeva can say in this new language of Mīmāṃsā that he could not easily have said in the old? It's hard to give a decisive answer one way or the other. Certainly, Khaṇḍadeva's basic argument against *matvarthalakṣaṇā* could in principle be formulated in traditional Mīmāṃsā terms, and indeed essentially was so formulated in the *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*. For a typical Mīmāṃsaka, the parallel with the case of the red cow – in which Mīmāṃsakas had long accepted multiple instruments construing with a single *bhāvanā* – would likely provide far more compelling support for Khaṇḍadeva's position than this talk of "describers" and "principal qualifiers", and would be much harder to get around in an argument. My own, admittedly rather cursory, survey of the later arguments against

and in support of Khaṇḍadeva's position on *matvarthalakṣaṇā* would seem to support this basic intuition; later discussions, pro and con, tend to be formulated very much in traditional Mīmāṃsā terms, and do not generally pick up on Khaṇḍadeva's own incorporation of Navya terminology.

Yet the case against *matvarthalakṣaṇā* we get in the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* is not simply a rehash of the that found in the earlier text. Most notably, Khaṇḍadeva now openly admits what he had earlier tried to downplay – that his argument completely overturns what had heretofore been the unquestioned Mīmāṃsā view of this issue; it seems somehow more than a coincidence that this open declaration of a new doctrine is coupled with even the limited and selective introduction of a new way of talking about the question in hand. Moreover, the language of “describers” offers Khaṇḍadeva a ready made tool for specifying what exactly it is that differentiates the functions of the two instruments, preventing them from obstructing or making one another redundant. Certainly there is *something* new in the substance of Khaṇḍadeva's argument here – something which cannot easily be disentangled from the terms in which it is formulated.

In any case, it should certainly be clear from the foregoing discussion that, while none of Khaṇḍadeva's works is untouched by the language of the New Logic, what we find in them is never simply an adoption of or an assimilation to Navyanyāya style. Whatever we may make of Khaṇḍadeva's use of Navyanyāya terms in particular cases, there is no mistaking that this mode of expression is for him one discursive tool among others – something to be employed on particular occasions and for particular purposes, rather than a dominating mode of discourse which simply displaces older forms of argument.

My growing sense is that the same may be said of the spread of Navyanyāya language into other fields as well. While there were few disciplines in the Sanskrit intellectual world of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that were not touched in some way by the style and terminology of Navyanyāya, the spread of this mode of expression appears to have been a far more complex and locally conditioned process than has generally been acknowledged. If we are ever to make detailed sense of this process, it is necessary above all that we ask ourselves not what Navyanyāya did to Indian philosophy, but rather what Indian philosophers did with Navyanyāya.

NOTES

¹ Bhaṭṭoji studied grammar with Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa and Mīmāṃsā with Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa, both famous teachers in late sixteenth century Varanasi (see *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 5: *The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 241); Jagannātha's father is said to have studied Mīmāṃsā with Khaṇḍadeva in Varanasi (see Nāgeśabhaṭṭa's commentary on verse 2 of *Rasaṅgādhara* [Benares Sanskrit Series 12ff, 1903, p. 2]), and Jagannātha himself studied with Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa's son Śeṣa Vīreśvara (*Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 5: *Philosophy of the Grammarians*, p. 215).

² See, for example, *Tattvabindu*, ed. V.A. Ramaswami Sastri (Annamalai University Sanskrit Series 3, Madras, 1936), Introduction, p. 118; *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, ed. S. Subrahmany Sastri (Madras, 1952), Vol. 4, p. ii; Umesh Mishra's appendix to Ganganath Jha's, *Purvaīmāṃsā in its Sources* (second ed., Varanasi: Benares Hindu University, 1964), p. 56.

³ Most notably, apart from Khaṇḍadeva's own work, Raghunātha Śīromaṇi's *Ākhyātvāda*, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra's *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, and Gadādharaḥṭṭa's *Vyūtpattivāda* in the field of Nyāya, and, in the field of grammar, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's *Vaiyākaraṇamattonmajjana*, and Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa's *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* (an extensive commentary upon the former).

⁴ Ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri (Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1970).

⁵ Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series 58 (Varanasi: Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series Office, 1923–1933), part 3, pp. 1–44.

⁶ *nanu sarvam idaṃ dhātvarthātiriktabhāvanāsadbhāve samañjasam | na tu tasyām eva pramāṇam paśyāmaḥ* | (ibid., p. 12).

⁷ Ed., with the commentary *Prabhāvali* of Śambhubhaṭṭa, by N.S. Ananta Krishna Sastri (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1921–1922), pp. 132–140.

⁸ *Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa* 19.7.3, quoted in Śabara's *Bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.4.1 (Anandashrama Sanskrit Series 97, 1970 [second ed.], Vol. 2, pp. 268ff). “Who desires cows” (“*paśūkāmaḥ*”) is carried over elliptically from the preceding sentence (see *Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa*, ed. Ānandacandra Vedantavāgīśa, Bibliotheca Indica, New Series, Nos 207ff, Vol. II, 1874, p. 496).

⁹ See, for example, Āpadeva's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaparakāśa*, edited with the commentary *Bhāṭṭālaṃkāra* of Anantadeva (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 268ff, Varanasi, 1921, pp. 52ff), Dinakarabhaṭṭa's *Bhāṭṭadinakara* on PMS 1.4.2 [Sarasvati Bhandar, Ramnagar Fort, Mīmāṃsā Ms #30, 46r–48v], Gāgābhaṭṭa's *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi* on PMS 1.4.1 (Adyar Library, Ms #64971, pp. 55–58).

¹⁰ The work is unpublished, and survives only in a single manuscript – see *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Tanjore Maharaja Serfoji's Sarasvati Mahal Library, Tanjore*, Vol. XII, Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and Uttara-mīmāṃsā (Srirangam: Vani Vilas Press, 1931), pp. 5159–5160. The manuscript is from the library of Gāmbhīrarāya Dīkṣita, father of Bhāskararāya, who seems to have played a major role in promulgating Khaṇḍadeva's Mīmāṃsā in South India in the early eighteenth century. One of Bhāskararāya's surviving Mīmāṃsā works is the *Vādakutūhala*, purportedly the transcript of a debate between himself and one Svāmīśāstrī, in which Bhāskararāya defends and the latter attacks Khaṇḍadeva's position on *matvarthalakṣaṇā* (see *Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Adyar Library*, Vol. IX [Madras: Adyar Library, 1952], pp. 139–140). One other short work of Khaṇḍadeva survives, also in a single manuscript belonging to Gāmbhīrarāya Dīkṣita (ibid., pp. 5157–5159) – its title is *Sthānino Bhāvanāvācivakhaṇḍanam* (“Rejection of the View that *Bhāvanā* is Expressed by the Substituend”).

¹¹ *Mīmāṃsākaustubha* on 1.4.2 (op. cit., part 2, p. 160 – see also pp. 157–158).

¹² For a fuller discussion of the Aruṇādhikaraṇa, see my article “The Hierarch-

ical Organization of Language in Mīmāṃsā Interpretive Theory,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 28, Nos. 5–6 (December 2000), pp. 442ff.

¹³ Or more precisely, with the compounds “pink-eyed” (*piṅgākṣyā*) and “one-year-old” (*ekahāyanyā*); the Mīmāṃsakas, with the support of Sanskrit grammatical theory, argue that each compounds directly designates the possessor of these attributes (here understood, by context or implication, to be a cow) – unlike the morphologically simple word “red” (*aruṇa*), which designates a particular quality, rather than its possessor; see, especially, Kumārila’s *Tantravārttika* on PMS 3.1.12 (Anandashrama Sanskrit Series 97, Vol. 4, pp. 33–41).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 162–164.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 164–165.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 165–166.

¹⁷ *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* on 1.4.2 (op. cit., pp. 75–80).

¹⁸ ... *matvarthalakṣaṇāvaśyakīti prāñcaḥ || vastutas tu dr̥ṣṭānte 'pi somasya karaṇatvenaiva bhāvanāyām evānvayaḥ ... ekakaraṇāvaruddhe 'pi karaṇāntarasya bhinnanirūpitasya prakāratayā bhāvanānvayopapatteḥ | na hi yāgakaraṇatvaṃ bhāvanānirūpitam, api tu svarganirūptam | ataś ca yathāivānyanirūpitam api tatkarāṇatvaṃ prakāratayā bhāvanāyām anveti, tathāiva somakarāṇatvaṃ ca na ko 'pi virodha itī nāsminn api pakṣe yady api matvarthalakṣaṇā, thatāpi viśeṣaṇavidhikṛtaguṇayāgobhayaviśiṣṭabhāvanāvidhigauravam āpadyamānam nāpahnotuṃ śakyam |* (*ibid.*, p. 76).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

University of Chicago